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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 Evolution of the issue of public health on an international level prompted 
states to establish an international organisation, the World Health 
Organization (WHO), whose mission is ‘the attainment by all peoples of the 
highest possible level of health’. With this goal in mind, the organisation is 
obliged to bring help and provide support, to stimulate cooperation and 
scientific research, and to promote all measures capable of contributing to 
progress in the protection of health. In the United Nations system the WHO 
is therefore the main institution responsible for protecting public health at an 
international level. This means that, in keeping with the principle regulating 
the powers of international organisations, it is an institution specialising in 
this area of activity. Such a function derives from the conviction that 
economic and social cooperation is best achieved by specialised institutions 
linked to the United Nations. At the same time the WHO enjoys a high 
degree of autonomy’.1 In the dispute regarding its autonomy or dependence 
on the UN, writers defining the role of the WHO seem to lean towards the 
organisation’s autonomy, irrespective of the type of control wielded over it 
and similar institutions by the UN, meaning that they acknowledge that the 
UN  cannot   impose  its  solutions  on  them,   because specialised  agencies 
 
                                                          
* Translation of the paper into English has been financed by the Minister of Science and 
Higher Education as part of agreement no. 848/P-DUN/2018. Translated by Jonathan Weber.— 
The article was written as part of a research fellowship, by way of competition, financed by the 
statutory funds of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the Adam Mickiewicz University in 
Poznań. 
1 The World Health Organization, as a specialized agency of the United Nations, is the first 
organisation whose knowledge and competencies defined in its statute and whose legal 
personality are responsible for public health on an international plane. This means that it is 
independent in this matter of any other entities of international law whatsoever. Its social goals 
as an intergovernmental organisation constitute the fundamental reason for which it was 
established, as responding to the needs of the states that created it. Member states decided to 
devolve to it the technical authority to respond to the expectations of these member states’ 
specialised administrations, with which it cooperates closely. Just like other specialised UN 
agencies, the WHO is sometimes recognised as a genuine international public service, which in 
some cases has led to it being granted primary rights for taking decisions or carrying out 
inspections. Member states strive not to politicise the organisation.  
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operate within the system of the United Nations, but not under its 
management’.  
 Today the World Health Organization plays a particularly crucial role in 
the fight against various kinds of epidemic. One of these is the Ebola virus 
epidemic. In its battle with this epidemic, the WHO is taking such measures 
as: securing access to the sick, their diagnosis, effective treatment, and 
finding a medicine enabling control of the virus, while simultaneously 
respecting the dignity of human beings and their beliefs.2 The epidemic also 
raises questions of a general nature concerning public health, including the 
sanitary state of populations—even in affluent countries—or equality in 
access to health care. Meanwhile the Constitution of the WHO acknowledges 
that ‘enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being’.3 
 However, as defined by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights4 in its General Comment No. 14, the effective realisation of the right 
to health requires the intervention of public authorities, particularly where 
fighting disease is concerned. This responsibility falls on states, through their 
own independent measures or via cooperation, and on international 
institutions—and in particular, on the World Health Organization. The 
spread of a virus and the frequently irrational fears5 that were evoked by this 
spread have gradually altered the approach to the problem. A local health 
crisis, which could have been brought under control by the WHO, became a 
regional and even global crisis, demanding a global reaction. Responsibility 
for this may only be borne by the UN, with which the WHO—as a specialized 
agency—must ‘establish and maintain effective cooperation’, and when 
requested by the UN should ‘provide or assist in providing support and help’.6 
This principle was included in the Security Council’s Resolution 2177 of 18 
September 2014, which expressed the conviction that the Ebola epidemic 







                                                          
2 The Ebola virus (or Ebola haemorrhagic fever) is a frequently fatal disease that first 
appeared in 1976, simultaneously in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan. The virus 
is endemic in these regions, and 2013 saw an ‘outbreak’ (a term used by the WHO) of the disease 
in West Africa; cf. WHO, Ebola response roadmap situation report update (21 November 2014). 
3 This is confirmed in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, according to which ‘parties […] recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’. 
4 Cf. General Comment No. 14, Document E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000). 
5 Cf. Courrier international no. 1250 (16–22 October 2014): 30–37. 
6 Relations between the UN and specialised agencies are based on the provisions of the 
Charter, agreements concluded between them, and on practice. These agreements are the 
consequence of the provision contained in Article 63 of the Charter, which grants the Economic 
and Social Council the power to enter into agreements with specialised agencies, subject to their 
approval by the General Assembly, and for the purpose of linking them to the UN. 
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II. REACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
TO THE THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY  
CAUSED BY THE EPIDEMIC 
 In March 2014 the WHO was notified of the first clusters of the Ebola 
haemorrhagic fever outbreak which appeared in Guinea in late 2013. Due to 
the rapid spread of infections, in August 2014 the WHO had to announce that 
it was an extraordinary event in the area of public health, with international 
consequences (International Health Regulations 2005).7 The UN’s response to 
the situation had appeared on 8 July 2014 in a press release issued by the 
UN’s West Africa Office, in which members of the Security Council expressed 
their serious concern with the Ebola outbreak in certain countries of West 
Africa, and called upon the international community to help prevent its 
spread. 
 From that moment on the United Nations’ response to the Ebola virus 
epidemic was to be directed towards achieving two goals: to obtain as broad a 
consensus as possible in the matter of fundamentals and the method for 
conducting the planned measures, and—in the face of the growing threat—to 
find the appropriate legal instrument enabling large-scale international 
mobilisation. With Resolution 2176 of 15 September 2014, on the possible 
renewal of the mandate for the United Nations’ Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 
the Council declared unambiguously expressed ‘grave concern about the 
extent of the Ebola virus in West Africa, in particular in Liberia, Guinea and 
Sierra Leone’; referring (though indirectly) to the concept of responsibility for 
protection, it also drew attention to the fact that the government of Liberia 
bore ‘primary responsibility for ensuring peace [and] stability’, as well as 
protection of the civilisation population. 
 Following the proclamation of the first resolution, further elements 
appeared that would determine the position of the Security Council and, in 
general, the United Nations. The Council Rada emphasised the connection 
between the epidemic and ‘lasting stability’ in Liberia, and indicated the 
elements essential for organising an adequate response: the main 
responsibility of the states; the role of regional and sub-regional 
organisations (Mano River Union, ECOWAS, and the African Union); the 
crucial significance of international cooperation in satisfying the demand for 
qualified medical personnel and the appropriate equipment; appointing a 
chief coordinator at the United Nations for combatting the Ebola virus; and 
finally the will expressed clearly by the states concerned to contain the 
epidemic within their borders. However, although when the UNMIL mandate 
was extended the Council mentioned the threats that Ebola created for the 
Mission’s success in building peace in Liberia, there was no mention in this 
document of the existence of a threat to international peace and security.8 
                                                          
7 Cf. G.L. Burci, J. Quirin, Ebola, WHO, and the United Nations: Convergence of Global 
Public Health and International Peace and Security (2014), 18 ASIL Insights. 
8 The UN Secretary General, who appointed a Senior Coordinator of the United Nations 
System Response to Ebola, and set in motion a mechanism for the organisation to react in a 
crisis situation, received a letter from the Presidents of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea calling 
for a ‘resolution on a comprehensive response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak’ that would 
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 Then, on 19 September 2014, following the Security Council’s adoption of 
Resolution 2177 (2014), the UN General Assembly passed a resolution 
regarding funds aimed at withholding and combatting the Ebola epidemic in 
West Africa. The justification given for this was the need ‘to limit this crisis 
in the area of public health due to the serious humanitarian, economic and 
social consequences that it may have’. The document also refers to the 
Security Council’s Resolutions 2176 (2014) and 2177 (2014), and notes with 
satisfaction the General Secretary’s intention to establish a UN Mission for 
Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). Consensus among the main bodies of 
the United National system had, in the face of the Ebola outbreak, been 
reached—achieved in conditions and according to formulas of major gravity. 
Resolution 2177 (2014) is positioned in the centre of the normative section of 
the United Nations system. It also reflects the existence of a broader 
consensus, extending to embrace the entire family of the United Nations. 
 
 
III. THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE  
AND SECURITY – THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 2177 (2014) 
 
 At this stage the Security Council had no choice. In order to take active 
measures to combat the Ebola outbreak, it had to draw on the provisions of 
the Charter that determines its powers, that is, on Article 24(1), imposing 
upon the Security Council the chief responsibility for maintaining  
international peace and security, and on Article 39, permitting it to take 
action in a situation where peace is threatened or has been breached. 
However, the Resolution has no mention of Chapter VII of the Charter, or of 
articles other than the above-mentioned 24 and 39; there is only a laconic 
sentence in which ‘[it is determined] that the unprecedented extent of the 
Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security’.9  
 Characteristic features of the Ebola virus meant that the threat would 
obviously spread to neighbouring countries, and thereafter to more distant 
regions, a spread that was favoured by the increase in the movement of 
peoples and international exchange.10 
                                                                                                                                                
include ‘coordinated international response to end the outbreak’; cf. UN Doc. S/2014/669 (29 
August 2014); on 17 September 2014 he sent identical letters to the President of the General 
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, in which he emphasised the security 
dimension of the crisis resulting from the epidemic. Document UN A/69/389-S/2014/679 (17 
September 2014). Most importantly, he announced the intention for the immediate establishing 
of a United Nations Mission to respond to the Ebola outbreak. 
9 According to the Security Council, this threat was of a virulence incomparable with that 
occurring during an ordinary epidemic. It affected above all the societies of unstable states in the 
process of building peace after years of armed conflict. It was so serious, that measures taken to 
date in this area could have been significantly hindered or even interrupted by the outbreak, 
with the barely regained stability undermined by ‘further instances of civil unrest, social 
tensions and a deterioration of the political and security climate’. 
10 Many countries were covered by this resolution, and in particular Nigeria, but the 
outbreak was also spreading to other African countries such as Mali. Outside of Africa, it also 
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 In this way the health crisis in three states could, due to the context, 
become a threat to peace and security, and then evolve into a threat on an 
international scale. Whereas the threat resulting from the health crisis 
turned into an economic, social, political and humanitarian crisis—and 
ultimately a crisis in security—its evolution can be explained by measures 
taken too late with the aim of containing the serious health crisis, expanding 
‘exponentially’, which then required the most urgent response. The threat 
directly affected peace and security, because it concerned countries involved 
in a process intended to restore lasting peace and security. As Rwanda’s 
representative remarked, the Security Council, which supported the peace 
processes in the three countries concerned, may have only worried about the 
consequences of the Ebola epidemic from the point of view of security. 
 The Security Council’s position, as well as the situation’s qualification 
adopted in order to face up to the outbreak of Ebola haemorrhagic fever, even 
if adopted out of necessity as a matter of urgency, had to be appraised in the 
light of the Charter’s provisions defining the Council’s range of powers and 
obligations. From this point of view, one may acknowledge that there existed 
certain nuances in the ‘revolutionary’ nature of the Council’s position. This 
was in line with the process of extending application of the term of threat to 
international peace and security, a process that began before the end of the 
Cold War, and that evoked numerous questions. However, it would seem that 
in this case, in the face of an Ebola epidemic, usage of this term in order to 
justify the Security Council’s intervention, could not be questioned. It was 
widely known that the concepts of international peace and security had 
undergone deep transformation in relation to the perspective that the 
authors of the Charter had to deal with, and which in terms of concept had 
not been questioned. However, this does not apply to their possible 
instrumentalisation by the Security Council.  
 Peace in the negative sense, that of the absence of armed conflicts, or even 
of armed conflicts between states, is accompanied today by a search for peace 
in the positive sense, meaning that of a global development responding to the 
desire for order—and even for more, for ‘social order’.11 Whilst the security of 
states and between states, pursuant to the provisions of the Charter, remains 
an essential condition for ensuring security for individuals, it is not sufficient 
and has to be supplemented by a search for the security of those people who 
depend upon being protected from such threats as poverty, hunger, crime, the 
violation of human rights, threats to the environment, human trafficking or 
disease.12 As such, in the light of positive peace and people’s security, where 
both  concepts  contain  a  component  of  health,  the  threats  had   become  
  
                                                                                                                                                
concerned people who had become infected with the disease before travelling to Europe or North 
America. 
11 J.-M. Sorel, L’élargissement de la notion de menace contre la paix, in: Le Chapitre VII de la 
Charte des Nations Unies, Paris 1995: 16; cf. P. d’Argent et al., Article 39, in: J.-P. Cot, A. Pellet, 
M. Forteau (eds.), Commentaire de la Charte des Nations Unies article par article, 3rd ed., Paris 
2005: 1164. 
12 Cf. C.-P. David, J.-F. Rioux, Le concept de sécurité humaine, in: J.-F. Rioux (ed.), La 
sécurité humaine, une nouvelle conception des relations internationales, Paris 2002: 19. 
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multidimensional, which was noted by the Security Council on 31 January 
1992 at a sitting of heads of state and government. This was confirmed by the 
Secretary General in his An Agenda for Peace13 and by the UN’s High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: ‘Any event or process that leads to 
large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the 
basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security’.14 
One may assert with certainty, and referring to the spirit if not the letter of 
the Charter,  that since that time health crises have constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, thereby justifying the measures taken by 
the UN.  
 At the UN it was the Security Council, responsible above all for 
maintaining international peace and security, that in reality promoted or 
even accelerated this transformation—since it took the decision to include 
‘economic and social threats’ in the category of threats to international peace 
and security. It did this by including in the agenda the famine in Africa, the 
issue of AIDS, the connection between energy, security and the climate, and 
the impact of climate change on maintaining peace. There are many elements 
in the legal instruments used by the Council, from debate during thematic 
meetings and declarations by the presidency to resolutions. Importantly, 
where health issues are concerned, the Security Council chose the form of 
resolutions.15 
 Resolution 2177 (2014) is undoubtedly part of the logic that would justify 
the Council’s usage of the qualification of a threat to international peace and 
security to undertake intervention against the Ebola epidemic. However, 
although this logic was questioned, the specific character of the context in 
which Resolution 2177(2014) was adopted allows one to go beyond the 
questions that the resolution’s text may provoke, since its adoption of the 
qualification of a threat to international peace and security took place 
without any formal explanation. 
 One can see here a frequent if not regular practice by the Council, 
manifested in its drive to confirm that it is executing, in this case, powers 
that are strictly reserved for it, as expressed in the now famous formula 
according to which ‘a threat to the peace as defined in Article 39 is only a 
situation in which the appropriate body for deciding to impose sanctions rules 
that the said situation really is a threat to the peace’.16 As such there are no 
obstacles to the Security Council deciding to qualify the Ebola epidemic as a 
threat   to   the   peace.   Admittedly,   these   powers—sometimes   appraised  
                                                          
13 Cf. B. Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277 (17 June 1992). 
14 Cf. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/625 
(2 December 2004). ‘So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the world must be 
concerned now and in the decades ahead: economic and social threats, including poverty, 
infectious disease […]’. 
15 Cf. Resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000, ‘on the Responsibility of the Security Council in 
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: HIV/AIDs and International Peace-
keeping Operations’ and Resolution 1983 (2011) of 7 June 2011 referring to the ‘maintenance of 
international peace and security’.  
16 J. Combacau, Le pouvoir de sanction de l’ONU. Etude théorique de la coercition non 
militaire, Paris 1974: 100. 
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negatively as bordering on arbitrariness and leading to an excessively 
guarded perception of matters covered by the international agenda—are not 
covered by the principle of legibus solutus. The Council is obliged to respect 
the Charter, through the provisions of which it was established, as well as 
the division of responsibilities and the statutory equilibrium established by 
the Charter. In addition, one may accept that in international law as well 
discretional power has its limits in obvious error of judgment. The above 
issues have frequently led to questions being raised, but in no way do they 
challenge the meaning of the qualification adopted by Resolution 
2177(2014).17 
 This issue could therefore change position in regard to the constitutional 
equilibrium contained in the Charter, insofar as we take into account the 
exercising of given powers, without applying coercion, that can be executed 
both by the Security Council and by the General Assembly. Whilst the 
Security Council bears chief responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security, it is the General Assembly (Article 10 of the UN Charter) 
that can discuss ‘any questions or any matters within the scope of the present 
Charter’, which obviously embraces issues of maintaining peace. According to 
Article 12(1), the Assembly has limited powers for issuing recommendations 
(but not for discussing matters) in a situation where the Security Council has 
already taken measures, performing the ‘functions assigned to it in the 
present Charter’. In this manner, in a hypothetical situation, both bodies 
would exercise their powers, powers that could prove to be in competition, 
because the Council would not act using means of coercion, but could all the 
same block any initiative whatsoever of the General Assembly. This would be 
possible were the Council to qualify a particular threat, even virtual, as a 
threat to international peace and security, thereby performing—on the basis 
of its own purely discretionary appraisal—‘functions assigned to it in the 
Charter’. Therefore the Council, uninhibitedly asserting the existence of 
threats, defines just as uninhibitedly the scope of its functions, and by its 
own discretion limits the scope of the General Assembly’s functions.  
 The determinants that sometimes lead to such observations reveal the 
areas in which this process could be criticised, and where debates on the 
topics of HIV/AIDS, and then climate change, crystallised. During the work 
on adopting Resolution 1308(2000), many states emphasised that the 
struggle with the HIV/AIDS pandemic depended on the General Assembly, 
and in fact on the Economic and Social Council.18 All bodies of the United 
Nations have been appointed to intervene, but while respecting the proper 
division  of  tasks  between  them,  and  in  particular  between  the General  
                                                          
17 Pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may only take action where 
a real threat, and not a virtual threat, has been ascertained. A common-sense interpretation of 
the word ‘threat’ should induce the Council to take preventative measures, but the subject of the 
threat must be very real. If the subject is possible, then the same goes for the threat. But the 
Council cannot base its actions on a virtual threat, putting at risk the balance established by the 
Charter, whether it is a matter of the equilibrium between state authorities and the UN’s 
powers, or between its General Assembly and the Security Council.  
18 Cf. H. de Pooter, Le droit international face aux pandémies: vers un système de sécurité 
sanitaire collective?, typescript of doctoral dissertation, Paris 2013: 199 (footnote 736). 
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Assembly and the Security Council, because fighting this pandemic is not 
among the main areas of the Council’s responsibility. During the debates on 
the impact of climate change on the maintaining of peace, opinions on this 
matter were formulated even more distinctly, and even took on 
institutionalised form. This explains, at least in part, the differences in views 
that Resolution 2177(2014) evokes. 
 The change is particularly evident in the debates leading up to its 
adoption. Only one state, Argentina, which frequently displays distrust 
towards the Council, openly presented not so much its opposition as nuances 
regarding its intervention. This country indicated that ‘the responsibility for 
dealing substantively with the causes and consequences of this epidemic is in 
the purview of other entities and agencies within the United Nations system, 
such as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and 
specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization’.19 While at an 
international level a fierce debate was underway regarding which of these 
bodies had the appropriate powers for facing the epidemic, the crisis had 
destroyed the structure of the societies affected by it, and was capable of 
ruining the achievements reached in these countries by international peace-
building efforts. As a result, peace and security were in serious danger at a 
national, regional and global level. Such an interpretation can by based on 
the characteristic features of the context in which the Council intervened, 
and which would seem to justify its measures. Firstly, the Council made a 
direct approach to the threat it intends to react to, qualifying it as a threat to 
international peace and security; such qualification did not appear in the case 
of two other resolutions concerning the issue of world health. Such a serious 
threat therefore had to entail measures that were not for a medium or long-
term perspective, but response as a matter of utmost necessity. The Security 
Council was therefore fulfilling the role defined by the Charter, not only in 
the area of conventional security, but also that of ‘civil’ security. Faced with 
the necessity of immediate action, the matter of rivalry with the General 
Assembly, its powers concerning the maintaining of peace in its structural 
sense, was no longer valid.20 There was no question of marginalising the 
General Assembly or any other institution in the United Nations system, but 
there was an aspiration to achieve the most effective division of missions 
fulfilled. The fact that 130 states signed the draft resolution confirms that the 
thinking contained in its wording steps far beyond the tight circle of Council 
members, and all the more so beyond the circle of its permanent members. 
 This is not without impact on the appraisal one could draw up of the 
Council’s execution of its discretionary powers. Putting it in more general 
terms, the said states manifested concerns frequently voiced against the 
discretionary power—bordering on arbitrariness—of the mighty but 
capricious Council, acting according to obscure procedures dominated by its 
permanent members, and in particular by western states. Such criticism can  
                                                          
19 Cf. declaration by Argentinian representative, UN Doc. S/PV.7268 (n 11) 23. 
20 According to P.-M. Dupuy, Après la guerre du golfe, Revue Générale de Droit International 
Public 95, 1991: 623–624. 
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be rebutted rather easily, since the Council had actually put itself in a 
situation of a bound competence: the decision resulting not from its own 
assessment, but from what had been determined by experts at the WHO and 
non-governmental organisations, above all the likes of Médecins Sans 
Frontières. The Council accepted the finding and qualified the situation as a 
threat to international peace and security. This point is above all about the 
exercising of discretionary powers.  
 However, the discretionary powers of the Security Council cannot be 
appraised without taking into account the means adopted by them, or the 
operations for which it granted its consent. Analysed from the point of view of 
the means implemented, Resolution 2177(2014) once again proves less 
revolutionary than it had seemed. The Security Council utilises all possible 
measures granted it by the system of collective security, but adjusts them to 
the gravity of the situation, posing a threat to this security. But is this still 
the simple adapting of the collective security system or is it genuine 
innovation, with the Security Council striving to present itself as the deus ex 
machina of global management?21 
 
 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
INSTRUMENTS 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIGHTING THE EBOLA OUTBREAK 
IN AFRICA 
 
 Apart from the Council’s exclusive right to assert the existence of a threat 
to peace and security, it also has the discretionary power (resulting from the 
Charter) to choose the forms of action. There are many forms, starting from 
mild measures to those of the most determined nature, quite frankly 
constituting means of coercion. Pursuant to Article 39, the Council may ‘give 
recommendations’ or ‘decide what measures need to be applied’, although the 
decision seems more ‘typical’ for collective security, without distinction 
resulting from the content of the means adopted: therefore a recommendation 
may serve as the basis for armed measures. One should note above all that 
the wording used by the Security Council in Resolution 2177(2014) makes full 
use of the capabilities granted by Article 39, and even steps beyond them; the 
Council most often ‘encourages’, but also ‘concludes’, ‘obliges’ and ‘requests’, 
meaning that it uses all phrases that seem to exclude any kind of obligatory 
scope of anticipated means. The adopted solution seems logical. In such a 
context, obligation seems inappropriate, while means of coercion do not entail 
usage of armed force, which is defined by Article 41, and even more—such 
means that embrace operations by armed forces anticipated in Article 42 
seem to have ‘little sense’. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out that as a result 
of the transition from recommendation to decision, the Council would use this 
power in substantive matters such as a motion addressed to states for the  
                                                          
21 Cf. R. Kolb, Le droit relatif au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, 
évolution historique, valeurs fondatrices et tendances actuelles, Paris 2005: 42. 
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application of security and health protection protocols, or the ‘lifting of 
restrictions to movement and boundaries imposed due to the Ebola epidemic’. 
The latter issue seems particularly sensitive, insofar as restrictions were 
actually introduced by states not directly affected by the epidemic.22 In other 
circumstances, the Security Council, citing the scope of decisions given on the 
basis of Article 25 of the Charter, could have ignored all objections from 
states regarding the imposing of international obligations by resolutions 
passed on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter.23 Could it have applied 
Resolution 2177 (2014) for the purpose of forcing the respect of the provisions 
of International Health Policy? In such a case it would have been more 
difficult to accuse it of taking on the role of international legislator, as the 
resolution would have had limited scope in time and space.24  
 The positions taken by several international organisations, apart from the 
WHO, could also have encouraged it to proceed in this direction. For example 
the International Civil Aviation Organization emphasised that countries 
unaffected by the epidemic should avoid taking ‘measures that will create 
unnecessary interference with international travel or trade’.25 Likewise, the 
Executive Council of the African Union, at its sitting on 8 September, called 
upon African states to lift all travel restrictions. However, the Security 
Council, which had already taken the first step towards qualification, 
certainly could not go further at this stage in the matter of the powers that it 
would be prepared to use for such qualification. In its operational measures 
implemented against the Ebola virus, the Security Council invoked the 
conventional instruments that it has for maintaining peace: on the one hand 
striving to secure action and directing the actions of states and international 
organisations, while on the other contributing to the organising of 
peacekeeping operations. Once again the untypical nature of the threat had a 
direct impact on these different ways of acting.  
 
                                                          
22 Western states, such as Australia and Canada, suspended the ‘considering of applications 
submitted by foreigners who were physically present in a country indicated by the WHO’. These 
measures were intended to restrict the spread of the disease on a large scale. However, this 
attitude was condemned and acknowledged as ineffective (and even having consequences the 
opposite to those intended) by the WHO and all medical staff in the field. It was also recognised 
as violating international health regulations, the goal of which is to prevent the spread of disease 
through proportional measures limiting the risk to public health. This was also the case with the 
temporary recommendation adopted by the WHO on the basis of the IHR (2005) on 29 April 
2009, in which countries decided to go beyond the recommendations, presenting scientific 
justification for their decision. As can be seen, countries not adhering to the commitments 
resulting from international law could have hindered the action of the Security Council in the 
face of a threat to international peace and security. 
23 Cf. P.-M. Dupuy, Y. Kerbrat, Droit international public, 12th ed., Dalloz 2014: 682; 
Resolution 1373(2001) is a noteworthy instrument, because it constitutes a genuine programme 
of action against terrorism, binding all member states; for more on this topic, cf. S. Szurek, La 
lutte internationale contre le terrorisme sous l’empire du Chapitre VII un laboratoire normative, 
in: Revue Générale de Droit International Public 109, 2005: 17. 
24 Cf. L. Condorelli, Les attentats du 11 septembre 2011 et leurs suites: où va le droit 
international?, in: Revue Générale de Droit International Publics 105, 2001: 834. 
25 Cf. UNWTO, Press Release no. 14056, Statement on travel and transport in relation to 
Ebola virus outbreak (18 August 2014). 
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 The order maintained in the resolution is significant: it refers to who 
manages the execution of the obligation for protection, above all to the states 
affected by the epidemic—and in particular those states that approached the 
organisation for measures to be taken towards protecting their population. 
The Council recommended measures in the area of health, defining how these 
measures should be implemented, but also social-economic, humanitarian, 
and security measures. Apart from lifting travel restrictions, the Council also 
approached third countries to request support and assistance for states 
affected by the outbreak by taking essential measures aimed at preventing 
the spread of the disease. The Council also decided in the classical manner to 
seek support in international organisations, above all regional organisations 
directly affected by the situation, suggesting—without invoking the 
Charter—a division of tasks not differing from that mentioned in the 
Charter’s Chapter VIII. Let us note, indeed, that the African Union 
intervened at an operational level with particular determination in the face 
of the threat, and before the United Nations system had reacted. Already on 
19 August 2014 the Peace and Security Council had taken a decision to 
establish a ‘mixed civilian and military African Union medical and 
humanitarian mission, comprising doctors, nurses and other medical and 
paramedical personnel, as well as the military personnel essential for 
protection and to sure the mission’s effectiveness’. In such a system, other 
regional organisations—and in particular the European Union—intervene as 
in the majority of peace operations in Africa, providing support for the 
activities of African organisations. 
 The UN system also made use of the technique of peace operations by 
establishing the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response 
(UNMEER), as well as through the mobilisation of existing operations. The 
establishing of UNMEER did not result from Resolution 2177 (2014), but 
from the decisions of the Security Council and the Secretary General, who—
like the General Assembly—was called upon to support this initiative.26 
 The Mission’s main task was to coordinate the activities of all bodies in 
the field: UN agencies, specialised agencies, regional organisations, states, 
non-governmental organisations, and other interested parties; the goal was to 
avoid the duplication of measures, and to ensure their effectiveness. In 
addition it functioned as a crisis management unit, its task being to ensure 
the overall approach, and to create a comprehensive action plan. UNMEER 
was also unique by way of its composition. It had its head office in Accra, but 
its operations were carried out in the three most affected countries, bringing 
together around one hundred UN functionaries ‘recruited from all over the 
world’, specialised agencies, and member states, with the involvement of both 
civilian and military personnel. The Mission also quickly set significant 
logistical  means  in  motion,  thanks  to  the  Secretary  General  lifting  the  
                                                          
26 This Mission, the first of its kind, and according to the General Secretariat one that could 
be repeated, was unique for more than one reason. Firstly, it was neither a military nor policing 
mission, but a life-saving UN medical mission under the auspices of the General Secretary 
directed by his special representative. Secondly, six strategic goals related to combating the 
Ebola virus were determined for UNMEER. 
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administrative and accounting restrictions in order to cope with the crisis 
situation. 
 Classic peace missions operating in the area, and especially those already 
functioning in countries affected by the outbreak, were also set in motion. 
Such was the case with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 
established with Resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003, involved in the 
process of strengthening peace and security, which received new 
responsibilities, to plan together with Liberian institutions involved in 
security operations that were essential in the situation of an extraordinary 
threat to health. Missions operating in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and in Mali 
(MINUSMA), without any modification to their mandates, took on tasks (in 
cooperation with UNMEER) essential for keeping the epidemic out of these 
countries and ensuring the continuity of their missions. 
 The usage of peacekeeping instruments adapted to combatting the Ebola 
outbreak is confirmed in the presence and terms of use of armed forces. While 
the combination of military and humanitarian operations has frequently been 
condemned, in this case military intervention was demanded by certain non-
governmental organisations, because the army proved to be the only force 
that was capable of setting in immediate motion logistic operations of a 
vastness required by the situation caused by the epidemic. However, in the 
case of UN missions, regional organisations, and initiatives taken by member 
states, the army here is solely an instrument in actions concerning health. 
 
 
V. BETWEEN COLLECTIVE SECURITY  
AND GLOBAL MANAGEMENT 
 
 The Security Council’s operation against the Ebola epidemic therefore 
seems ambivalent. The Council’s action was based on a system of collective 
security, and it used instruments provided by this system with the purpose of 
conducting a campaign differing somewhat from its traditional role. This 
means that in this case its role was neither that of a policeman, as 
anticipated in the Charter, nor that of a legislator, to which it sometimes lays 
claim.27 
 Countries that took measures were tasked with warning, mobilising and 
coordinating, while the purpose of including the Security Council in the 
campaign, due to the extremely urgent nature of the situation, was to ensure 
a kind of triple mission. Raised to such a rank, the issue ‘took advantage’ of 
the Council’s involvement thanks to an incomparably higher level of publicity 
for the situation than if the General Assembly had undertaken intervention. 
The matter also gained further drama since the Council is a body that 
usually gets involved in matters of war or peace. The campaign was helped by  
                                                          
27 For more on the subject, cf. United Nations Charter of 26 June 1945, Journal of Laws of 
the Republic of Poland 1947, No. 23, item 90 as amended; L. Kasprzyk, Rozwój ekonomiczny—
nadzieją na wyrównanie szans, in: J. Symonides (ed.), Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych. 
Bilans i perspektywy, Warsaw 2006: 245–261. 
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the authority resulting from the Security Council’s powers of adopting acts of 
an obligatory or even coercive nature. One should also add the benefit 
resulting from its empowerment, since this body functions—pursuant to 
Article 24(1) of the Charter—on behalf of all member states. In this role the 
Council operated within the idea of collective security, the goal of which is to 
ensure security for everybody through action taken by everybody.28 However, 
its methods of action are far from this: the Council has to develop not in the 
direction of an hierarchical structure, but a net structure. The list of players 
that can be mobilised is undefined, regardless of their legal status; this 
applies in particular to non-governmental organisations, private foundations, 
and also enterprises. The Security Council should therefore replace coercion 
and hard law regulations with persuasion. 
 Certain features of management—or to be more precise, of so-called global 
management—have been distinguished here.29 Irrespective of any conceptual 
doubts related to these terms, the United Nations logically granted itself the 
right to global management, because it ‘is the only forum at which general 
problems may be resolved with the support of all players of the international 
community’. As a result, all UN bodies are expected to become parties 
interested in global management.  
 However, the case of the Security Council is special, because the Charter 
gave it a special mission in the area of collective security. The council, relying 
on the evolution of this system and its convergence, manifested in global 
management, combines these two functions (guaranteeing collective security 
and steering global management).30 From this point of view, Resolution 
2177(2014) therefore constituted a particularly significant step. However, as 
Arcari had shown, ‘elements of dissonance’ exist between collective security 
and global management, leading to a questioning not of the legitimacy but 
the effectiveness of the Security Council’s work in this area.  
 Therefore, in order to combat an epidemic, global management must be 
carried out long-term, and must be sustained: the goal is to create or to 
streamline national healthcare systems that either do not exist or are failing, 
and this can be achieved by implementing appropriate development policy. 
However, by no means can one talk here of an ordinary manner of action, 
forced most often by extremely urgent situations—and such situations do not 
seem so far to have occurred with the same severity in most countries. 
Moreover, the response by the Security Council in the face of the epidemic is 
also the result of a reductional attitude, prompting one to resolve 
international problems via their actual or perceived dimension of security. 
 
                                                          
28 J. Salmon defines collective security as the situation whereby everybody may reap benefits 
in the form of common measures, guarantees for the whole of society, Dictionnaire de droit 
international public, Brussels 2001: 1024. 
29 Cf. J.-M. Moreau-Defarges, La gouvernance, Paris 2003; cf.: J.-L. Dunoff, J.-P. Trachtman 
(eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance, 
Cambridge 2009, and particularly in the legal aspect: M. Kamto, Droit international de la 
gouvernance, Paris 2013. 
30 L. Balmond, Gouvernance globale et sécurité collective, les profils d’une convergence, in: M. 
Arcari, L. Balmond, op. cit.: 3–22. 




 The question posed in this article was about whether the fight with 
pandemics, which—hypothetically—forces one to seek a balance between a 
country’s security and free trade, is adopting the form of a ‘collective system 
of health security’. Taking the traditional definition of collective security, 
transferred by analogy to cases of pandemic, we ask whether, in exchange for 
waiving the right to apply unilateral sanitary means significantly violating 
freedom of trade, any country can make use of the international community’s 
guarantee in the form of joint measures administered by international bodies 
in a situation where there is the danger of an infectious disease spreading, 
and in such a way for the system of collective health security not to violate 
countries’ rights to apply individual measures essential for the protection of 
health within their borders. 
 Analysis of the issue presented in this article reveals that in the case of 
fighting an epidemic we are dealing with elements of a ‘collective system of 
health security’. These elements are the forms of joint measures managed by 
international organisations and institutions, within the framework of which 
any country may enlist the support of the international community.31 The 
necessity of such joint action is brought about above all by the trans-border 
character of the pandemic threat, and places countries in a situation of 
interdependence. States have thus shaped the universal system of collective 
health security contained in the International Health Regulations. One could 
essentially assert that both in the case of the fight with the Ebola epidemic, 
and with earlier epidemics, we have been dealing rather with the mechanism 
of global crisis management than the actual forming of a system of health 
security. As Jan Sandorski emphasises, one may draw the mistaken 
conclusion from deliberations to date that the international community’s 
fight with the pandemic is taking place solely in the countries of the political 
South.32 
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THE EBOLA PANDEMIC AS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: 
A QUESTION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY OR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE? 
 
S u m m a r y 
 
The international community faces a fragmented and transnational epidemiological threat, 
the  severity and  extent of  which currently require an unprecedented level of intervention. Over  
                                                          
31 Cf. A.D. Rotfeld, The Role of the International Community, in: M.F. Plattner, A. Smolar 
(eds.), Globalisation, Power and Democracy, Baltimore–London 2000: 83–96. 
32 For more on this subject, cf. J. Sandorski, Międzynarodowa ochrona praw człowieka a 
HIV/ AIDS, Poznań 2002; E. Karska (ed.), Globalne problemy ochrony praw człowieka, Warsaw 
2015. 
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the centuries, mankind has been confronted with a variety of epidemics that have always 
required a comprehensive action at the international level. According to the UN Security 
Council, the outbreak of the Ebola virus at the end of 2013 poses a particular threat to 
international peace and security, as the peace-building and development achievements of the 
countries most affected by the epidemic are jeopardised and may end in vain or be lost 
altogether. This in turn undermines the stability of the countries most affected. If the disease is 
not brought under control, this situation might lead to a new unrest and social tensions, and 
worsening of the political climate, or stigmatisation and a higher sense of uncertainty in the 
region. The resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on this matter has a historic 
dimension, as it has for the first time classified a public health problem as a threat to 
international peace and security. This happened despite the fact that international mobilisation 
had been delayed by several months, despite the obvious urgent need for action. 
